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ABSTRACT

Factors associated with the immigration of the Japanese to the United States, which began in the 1880's, are discussed in this document. The types of occupations Japanese pursued and why and how they were discriminated against in their adopted country are also examined. The historical background behind the relaxation of Japan's emigration policies is reviewed. Limited industrial development in Japan and the labor shortage in Hawaii caused by the decimation of that territory's native population are cited as factors which brought about the initial emigration. Japan's economic and labor history since 1885 is reviewed in this context. Immigration to the U.S. mainland, primarily California, is also described. There is an emphasis on the relationship between U.S. government policies and such phenomena as demographic and occupational distribution, wage earning possibilities, and the social and family lives of the Japanese immigrants. Strained relations between Japan and the U.S., anti-Japanese sentiment among the American public, and the passage of discriminatory legislation passed during the first quarter of this century are described.
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ISSEI: THE FIRST FIFTY YEARS
(Teacher's Manual)

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Introduction

The most blatant act of racism against Japanese took place during World War II when over 110,000 West Coast Japanese were confined behind barbed wire. In order to understand how and why this traumatic event could have occurred in such a democratic country, it is essential to study the Japanese experience in America from the first Japanese immigration to Hawaii in 1885 to the exclusion in 1924 of Japanese from the United States. It was during this period that the seeds for war relocation were sown.

At first, Japanese immigrants were welcomed as a source of cheap labor. However, as they came to achieve economic success after years of hard labor and frugal life, this group progressively became the target of racial prejudice in American society.

The history of Japanese in the United States is very unique in that they fell victims several times to the fierce rivalry in world politics between their mother country and host country. So long as Japan was a weak nation, anti-Japanese movement on the West Coast remained submerged. In the wake of the Russo-Japan War, however, Japan's expansionist policy came into direct conflict with American interests in China, with the consequence that the Japan-U.S. relations continued to deteriorate. Such development in the trans-Pacific affairs coincided with the rapid and steady growth on the Pacific Coast of the Japanese population and their economic activities. The United States reacted to Japan's challenge by resorting

to statutory discriminations against the Japanese immigrants. Such a move on the part of the government further aroused ill feeling among the American people toward this ethnic group.

This manual will examine why Japanese immigrated to America, what types of occupations they pursued, and why and how they were discriminated against in their adopted country.

Background of Japanese Migration to Hawaii

Since 1639, the Shogunate government of Japan maintained an isolationist policy. It refused to trade with any country other than China and Holland, and prohibited Japanese people under penalty of death from going abroad. As the result of Commodore Matthew Perry's visit in 1853 to Japan, the policy of seclusion was abrogated in 1858 when a treaty of amity and commerce was concluded between Japan and the United States. Later, Japan opened her doors for trade with European powers with similar treaties, but the Shogunate regime continued to ban the overseas migration of its nationals. In 1868, 265 years of feudalistic rule by the Tokugawa Family came to an end and was superseded by the Emperor system through a bloody civil war known as the Meiji Restoration.

The history of Japanese overseas migration began on April 29, 1868, when 42 men were clandestinely transported to Guam by Eugene M. Van Reed, an American businessman residing in Yokohama who also held the title of Consul General of the Kingdom of Hawaii. In less than a month, he also shipped 153 Japanese contract laborers to Hawaii aboard the Sciotto, an American vessel, without authorization from the Japanese government. Of the 42 Japanese who went to Guam, 14 died on the sugar plantations, and the rest returned penniless to Japan by the end of 1871. Those who went to Hawaii did no better. Within four years, 40 returned to Japan with hardly any savings, while 46 re-emigrated to the United States. Disturbed by the deplorable outcome of the two groups, the Japanese government suspended emigration to those islands until 1884, when a contract was signed between the governments of Japan and Hawaii to supply the Kingdom's sugar

Industry with Japanese laborers.

Two factors contributed to Japan's decision to remove its ban on emigration. The first was an acute labor shortage in the Hawaiian sugar industry. The second was a severe economic crisis in Japan which affected the rural sector of Japanese society most sharply. Hawaii's short supply of man power was created by the rapid growth of its sugar industry on the one hand, and the continuous decline of its indigenous population. In 1875 a treaty was concluded between Hawaii and the United States to reciprocate the abolition of the customs duty on each other's export items. This preferential treatment greatly augmented the competitive power of Hawaiian sugar industry in the islands. In the meantime, however, Hawaii's contact with Western civilization was accompanied by the introduction of hitherto unknown diseases, causing the native population of the islands to decrease at an alarming rate. Between 1853 and 1878, the Hawaiian population diminished by 20% from 73,000 to 58,000 and a manpower shortage developed on the sugar plantations. Unable to secure enough laborers from Chinese and Portuguese immigration, the sugar planters turned to Japan as a potential source for their labor needs. In 1879, the Hawaiian Board of Immigration began to negotiate with Japanese authorities for the introduction of contract laborers from Japan. In an attempt to expedite the negotiation, King Kalakaua visited Japan in March, 1881, accompanied by William N. Armstrong, Hawaiian Foreign Minister and Immigration Commissioner, who requested the Japanese government to remove its ban on emigration to Hawaii. The royal visit did not bring immediate results. No immigration treaty was signed. But it contributed to improving the relationship between the Japanese Empire and the Hawaiian Kingdom.

In Japan, the National Treasury was exhausted after the Satsuma Rebellion of 1877 in which discontented ex-samurai of Kagoshima revolted

under the leadership of Takamori Saigo against the Imperial government. During the insurrection the government issued a huge quantity of inconvertible paper money to defray the war expenditure, and this caused the Japanese economy to be plagued by chronic inflation for many years.

In 1881, when Masayoshi Matsukata became Finance Minister, rigid deflationary measures were taken to combat protracted inflation. By 1884 the prices of commodities declined by 20%, and the price of rice, which was the staple food as well as the main source of revenue in Japan, dropped by as much as 40%. Farmers fared worst of all groups in the deflation program since they paid taxes on the absolute value of their property instead of on the fluctuating value of their produce. Whether they had a good crop or not, or whether the price of rice was high or low, farmers had to pay a fixed sum of money for their land tax. The agricultural sector was the only segment of society that bore such a tax burden.

In an attempt to promote Japan's industrialization and to stimulate the economy as a whole, the Imperial government adopted a protective policy, in which the industrial and commercial sectors were exempt from taxation. Since the agricultural sector accounted for 70% of the national revenue, the government could not afford to lower the land tax even at the time of deflation. Although Matsukata's anti-inflationary policy brought about the stabilization of the currency, it proved devastating to the farmers. Unable to bear the heavy taxes, many small and medium-sized farm owners were driven to become either tenant farmers or industrial laborers. The latter group was extremely small since Japan's industrialization had not expanded rapidly enough to absorb the dislocated segment of the population. Furthermore, the predominant branch of industry at the time was silk and cotton spinning which had been oversaturated by the

daughters of poor farmers. With firm determination to build a strong army and achieve modernization, the Japanese government had no choice but to sacrifice its agricultural sector. By the mid-1880's, the prolonged depression also forced many small merchants to go out of business. Under these circumstances, the Japanese government finally acquiesced to the request of the Kingdom of Hawaii and permitted the migration of contract laborers from Japan. In 1884, a contract extremely favorable to the Japanese was signed by the two governments under the following terms:

1. The Hawaiian Board of Immigration provided free passage to and from Japan for the Japanese laborers, their wives and children.
2. The minimum rate of wages was nine dollars per month with food or fifteen dollars without food.
3. The term of contract was three years.

The first contingent of 953 public contract immigrants embarked for Hawaii in January, 1885. As many as 28,000 people applied for 953 slots in the first shipment. This indicated the severity of the depression on the one hand, and the profitability of contract migration to Hawaii on the other. Since a laborer in Japan earned on an average ten cents a day in those days, the wages in Hawaii, as stipulated in the contract, were at least five times higher. One of the couples that went to Hawaii in 1885 remitted \$130 to their family within one year, a sum that exceeded the amount an average farmer in Japan could earn in three years.

Migration to Hawaii

Between 1885 and 1894, 27,995 laborers, of whom 5,739 were women, were transported to the Hawaiian Islands under the auspices of the Japanese government. The majority of these immigrants came from Southwest Japan, especially from the prefectures of Hiroshima and Yamaguchi. There

were four main reasons for this. First, temporary domestic migration as a means of supplementing income had long been practiced as way of life in these prefectures. Second, since Hiroshima and Yamaguchi were both seaboard prefectures with numerous islands, the inhabitants were accustomed to navigating and were not afraid of overseas migration. Third, it was in this region that the agricultural sector had been hardest hit. Finally, the people from Hiroshima and Yamaguchi had constituted the bulk of previous emigrants, and frequent success stories from the outset further motivated the inhabitants of these prefectures to migrate to Hawaii.

Emigration companies played a major role in early Japanese migration to Hawaii. The emigration business was very lucrative and required relatively little capital. As long as they recruited and transported many laborers, the emigration companies could make a sizeable profit because they charged each prospective emigrant \$10.00 to \$12.50 for handling services. A skilled laborer in Japan had to work two months to earn this amount of money. Moreover, the companies received the brokerage from the emigrants' employers and the rebate not only from the steamship companies but from the inns at the port cities where the emigrants were accommodated until their departure for Hawaii. Therefore, emigration agents used exaggerated and even deceptive propaganda to lure people into migrating to Hawaii. Since 1894, when they took over indentured immigration to Hawaii from the Japanese government, the emigration companies had sent 46,258 laborers to the sugar plantations by 1900.

During this period better known as the "private contract immigration" period, a great number of immigrants continued to come from the southwestern part of Japan, for the cotton culture along the coast of the Seto

Inland Sea had collapsed by the mid-1890's, thus reducing many cotton growers to destitution. In 1887, there were 222,300 acres of cotton fields in Japan, and the government protected the domestic cotton growers by imposing high tariffs on the foreign raw cotton. Because of mechanization and abundant supply of cheap labor, the cotton textile industry was expanding rapidly and depended increasingly on imported cotton. After Japan's victory against China, Japan monopolized the Korean market and greatly increased her share in the Chinese market. The production of cotton goods was spurred to such an extent that in 1896, the government abolished import duty on foreign cotton wool at the sacrifice of the domestic cotton farmers. This accounted for the exodus to Hawaii of many farmers from the former cotton region in Southwest Japan.

At the individual level, the immediate and strongest drive for overseas migration was the simple fact that it paid to go to Hawaii. During the period of government contract immigration, the total remittance from the Japanese immigrants in Hawaii averaged approximately \$1,000,000 per annum, an amount equivalent to 1% to 2% of Japan's national expenditure. In 1899, for instance, some 8,600 Hiroshima immigrants in the Hawaiian Islands either remitted or took to their homeland nearly \$380,000. In other words, in that year Hiroshima received \$44.00 from each one of those compatriots in Hawaii who could either remit or bring money to their families in Japan. This sum amounted to two thirds of a skilled worker's annual income in Japan. Of the \$380,000 remitted and brought to Hiroshima in 1899, 34% was put in savings and 31% was used for debt payments, while 16% was invested and the remaining 19% was appropriated for other purposes.

The United States prohibited the importation of contract immigrants

in 1885, and therefore following her annexation of Hawaii in 1898, Japanese Indentured immigration to the Islands was banned two years later. A prospective immigrant was now known as a free immigrant and had to pay the passage himself and prove that he was not a pauper. This was done by showing \$50 in cash to the port Inspector upon arrival in Hawaii. An outbreak of bubonic plague and the extreme cost involved in free immigration caused the Japanese entries into the Hawaiian Islands to decline sharply to 1,529 in 1900, as compared with 17,973 the year previous. Nevertheless, a critical labor shortage in the sugar industry led to the resumption of a massive transportation of Japanese immigrants to the Territory of Hawaii in 1902.

Since wages were still several times higher in Hawaii than in Japan, prospective immigrants experienced little difficulty in obtaining a loan from their relatives in Japan or money lenders to pay the boat fare. The \$50 which a free immigrant had to have in his possession at the time of landing in Hawaii was loaned by an emigration or a steamship company which charged a 10% interest in advance. As soon as he showed the money to the immigration official and was permitted to enter Hawaii, the immigrant had to send the \$50 back to the lender in Japan. Once the free immigrant was in Hawaii, the Japanese emigration company found a job for him and charged a fee of \$4 to \$5. Legally, the emigration company could not handle noncontract emigration, but it did make a considerable profit by using this cunning device to exploit free immigrants.

In 1907, 11,600 Hiroshima immigrants in Hawaii sent or took back \$900,000 to Japan, or an average of \$78 per person, which was as much as a skilled laborer in Japan could earn per year. Since immigration was profitable for the immigrants, as well as the emigration companies,

Hawaiian Immigration continued as long as the sugar planters were much in need of cheap labor. As a result, 68,326 Japanese entered Hawaii during the period of free immigration from 1900 to 1907.

The political and economic background in Japan, Hawaii, and the United States present different reasons to account for the large number of Japanese laborers who migrated to Hawaii during this period. Chronic economic constriction characterized Japan for two decades after the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95. The postwar depression began in 1896 when the Bank of Japan raised the rate of interest, causing many business firms and small banks to go bankrupt. Owing to bad crops and stagnation of foreign trade, the depression lingered on through the end of the 1890's. Before Japan recovered from its lingering slump, the Boxer Rebellion broke out in China in 1900, which seriously interrupted Japanese exportation to that country. Because China was then the principal importer of Japanese manufactures, the suspension of trade affected the Japanese economy in such a way that as many as 79 banks went out of business in 1900 alone.

In preparation for the impending war against Russia, the Japanese government again burdened the agricultural sector with higher taxes. In 1898 the land tax was raised by 32% over the next five years for the purpose of increasing the military budget. Moreover, with the enactment of the River Law in 1896, the government promoted a flood control program with the object of boosting the agricultural output. Consequently, the production of rice, among other things, rose tremendously. On the other hand, however, the heavy expenses of river improvement borne by the agricultural population, coupled with the increased land tax, forced numerous landed farmers, as well as small and medium landlords to sell their

property to larger landlords. Therefore, the second and third sons of such impoverished agriculturists, or quite frequently the family heads themselves, migrated to Hawaii with the intention of amassing a fortune in several years and coming home rich so that they could redeem their lost lands.

Although Japan achieved a nominal victory in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05, her coffers had been drained because of an all-out war effort. Since the hostilities were confined primarily to Manchuria, Japan was unable to win a decisive victory. For this reason, the Czarist regime flatly refused to pay any reparations. When the hostilities ended, the Japanese Empire was deeply in debt due to the \$400 million worth of bonds floated during the war in Great Britain and the United States. There was not even a temporary postwar boom, and when the war veterans came back they could not find employment. At this time, Japan's leading industry was still textile manufacturing which accounted for two thirds of the total industrial labor force. The textile industry, though, required mainly female labor and therefore was unable to accommodate the returning veterans. Furthermore, labor conflicts became even more numerous after the Russo-Japanese War. In 1907, 57 strikes broke out, in which 9,855 workers were involved, as compared with only six labor disputes with 879 participants in 1904. The severity of the postwar slump was reflected in the large number of immigrants who went to Hawaii during the first two years following the conclusion of the War against Russia. Of the 46,510 Japanese immigrants who went to Hawaii in 1906 and 1907, 6,766 were women and as many as 39,384 were men. Many of these men were veterans of the Russo-Japanese War, and this fact later gave anti-Japanese agitators grounds for accusing them of being a fifth column.

Over a period of 23 years from 1885 to 1907, Hawaii received 142,539 Japanese immigrants, of whom only 63,573, or approximately 45% of the total, either returned to Japan or re-emigrated to the United States mainland. Before the Gentlemen's Agreement of 1908 many had migrated to Hawaii solely for the purpose of amassing a fortune in several years and returning to their homeland with a decent amount of capital. Therefore, the immigrants had no intention of settling down permanently in Hawaii. Furthermore, since their chief concern was to become rich as soon as possible in pursuit of even higher wages, the Japanese laborers did not hesitate to move at the first opportunity to the continental United States.

Migration to the Continental United States

It was in 1869 that the first contingent of Japanese immigrants arrived in the United States. Some twenty Japanese established a settlement known as the Wakamatsu Colony at Gold Hill, El Dorado County in California under the leadership of Edward W. Schnell, a Dutch arms merchant who fled Japan since he had supplied weapons to the rebel forces which were defeated by the Imperial Army during the civil war of the Meiji Restoration in 1868. The colonists began to grow tea and mulberry for silk worms, but their venture ended in a fiasco in less than a year because of lack of funds and an epidemic which claimed several lives. When Edward Schnell abandoned the Japanese settlers and returned to Europe, they left the colony and dispersed in all directions.

Before the Japanese immigrants in Hawaii began to re-emigrate to the United States in 1892, most Japanese who came to America were students, merchants, and sailors who deserted their ships upon arrival at America

ports. From 1868 to 1873, the United States received nearly 500 government sponsored students from Japan. In 1871, the Japanese government sent Prince Tomomi Iwakura to the United States as ambassador plenipotentiary to negotiate a revision of the treaty of amity and commerce which was signed between the two countries in 1858. Fifty-nine students, of whom five were girls under fifteen years of age, accompanied the Prince and his entourage.

Those who came to study in the United States at their own expense, worked as house boys or domestics in order to finance their studies. In California, for example, a Japanese household servant earned approximately \$15 a month in 1873, while a house boy was provided with board, clothes, and some spending money.

By 1890, 1,979 Japanese resided in the continental United States, with 350 in New York, 1,620 in San Francisco, and 9 in the state of Washington. Of the 1,979 Japanese, as many as 1,689, comprising 85% of the total, were reported to be students.

In the meantime, the Chinese exclusion law of 1882 had created a grave labor shortage in California agriculture and railroad construction in the intermountain states of Utah, Idaho, Wyoming, and Nevada. In 1892, Japanese immigrants in Hawaii, with expectations of receiving higher wages, began to migrate to the mainland states to fill the labor demand. As a consequence, the Japanese population in the mainland grew from 2,582 in 1891 to 5,754 a year later. By 1892, Japanese immigrant laborers on the mainland outnumbered students at the ratio of seven to three.

After 1898, many more Japanese began to migrate to the continental United States, using Hawaii as a stepping stone. The American annexation of the islands in 1898 served to motivate the Japanese for this re-emigratic

in two ways. First, American law put an end to Japanese contract immigration to Hawaii, and annulled the valid contracts for plantation labor. Consequently, 24,028 Japanese laborers were freed from their contract obligation, and employers suffered dire losses since no compensation was made by the government. A second factor was that Hawaii became a part of the United States. No legal barriers could stop the Japanese laborers from going to the mainland. In view of the fact that in the continental United States a laborer could earn at least \$26 a month, as compared with \$16 in Hawaii, labor contractors who were sent to Hawaii by farm owners and railroad companies had little difficulty recruiting thousands of Japanese immigrants and transporting them aboard chartered ships to the West Coast.

Bringing laborers to the mainland was very profitable for Japanese labor contractors. In 1897, Japanese laborers working for the Northern Pacific Railroad, Oregon Railway, and Oregon Short Line earned \$1.25 to \$1.35 per day. A labor contractor charged each laborer a ten cent commission a day in addition to \$1.50 a month for hospital and interpreters' fees. A labor contractor, for example, who had 300 laborers working 26 days per month could make a monthly income of \$780 from commissions alone. Thus, labor contractors worked feverishly to persuade the Japanese in Hawaii into coming to the mainland.

Between 1902 and 1907, 37,166 Japanese migrated from Hawaii to the mainland. At the same time, thousands of Japanese immigrants in Canada and Mexico sneaked into the United States, and the Japanese population in the mainland skyrocketed from 1,979 in 1890 to 85,726 in 1907. Although big farmers and railroad companies welcomed the coming of Japanese laborers white workers felt threatened by the sudden influx of cheap competitors and the rapid growth of the Japanese population on the Pacific Coast.

In the meantime, Hawaiian sugar planters, who feared that Hawaii would be drained of its manpower, appealed to Congress to prevent the Japanese immigrants from leaving the islands for the mainland. In February, 1907, Congress enacted a law prohibiting the re-emigration of Japanese laborers to the mainland. Such a measure was taken for two reasons. The first was in relation to Japan. After emerging victorious in the Russo-Japanese War, Japan posed as a major world power and threatened American interests in China. Before the War, the Manchurian market had been dominated by the British and American cotton goods. After the War, however, Japanese cotton manufacturers began to dominate the northern Chinese market, and reduced the American share from 36% in 1905 to 8% in 1913 and finally to 0.3% in 1929. The second reason was in relation to Japanese immigration. In consideration of strong racial prejudice on the West Coast, as manifested against Chinese immigrants, the Japanese government restricted the migration of its nationals to the continental United States. For this reason, the Japanese usually went to Hawaii first, for which passports were easily issued, and after a few months' stay in the islands departed for the mainland. Between 1905 and 1907, the postwar depression in Japan motivated 53,196 Japanese, a majority of whom were discharged veterans of the Russo-Japanese War, to go to Hawaii. During the same period as many as 27,316 Japanese immigrants entered the mainland from the islands. Alarmed by the rate at which Japanese were flowing into the Pacific Coast, the United States government attempted to prohibit the migration of Japanese laborers from Hawaii. As a result, Japanese entries into Hawaii declined sharply from 20,865 in 1907 to 9,153 a year later.

Japanese immigrants had a hostile reception in the mainland. In October, 1906, the San Francisco Board of Education passed a resolution

excluding Japanese children from the public schools and sent them to an exclusive Oriental School with Chinese and Korean pupils. At that time 93 Japanese school children, of whom 25 were United States citizens, were attending 22 different schools in San Francisco. The Japanese government immediately made a protest against the resolution on the grounds that such racial segregation was an insult to Japan's national dignity. The Japanese felt that they had attained the status of a first-rate power by defeating Russia. President Theodore Roosevelt was cognizant of Japan's International status, but at the same time, wanted to use Japanese government sensitivity to the advantage of the United States. He exerted his power and influence in an effort to overturn the resolution adopted by the San Francisco Board of Education. After a series of difficult negotiations, the Board grudgingly agreed to rescind its resolution in exchange for the Gentlemen's Agreement, which was signed in February, 1908, to restrict Japanese immigration to the United States. Under this agreement, the Japanese government pledged to limit the issuance of passports solely to students, merchants, travelers, re-entering immigrants, and the immediate family members of those immigrants who were already residing in America. At the same time, it made passports issued for Hawaii, Canada, and Mexico invalid for the continental United States. Consequently, Japanese entries into the mainland drastically dropped to 2,432 in 1909, as compared with 9,544 the year before.

Japanese Associations

In the wake of the intensifying anti-Japanese movement on the West Coast, the Japanese Association of America was founded in San Francisco in February, 1908, with a view of protecting the rights and privileges of the Japanese, as well as promoting their Americanization as a means of appeasing the antagonism directed against them. Other Japanese communities followed the example of the Japanese in San Francisco and organized the Japanese Association of Oregon at Portland in 1911, the Northwest American-Japanese Association at Seattle in 1913, and the Central Japanese Association of Southern California at Los Angeles in 1915. By 1924, as many as 77 local Japanese Associations had been founded. All were affiliated with the four principal regional organizations which were located in the seats of the Japanese Consulates. With some 64,000 immigrants and their descendants, Northern California boasted the largest Japanese community in the mainland, and the Japanese Association of America in San Francisco was the largest and most powerful of all, exerting influence on 38 local Japanese Associations.

In addition to the Japanese Associations on the West Coast, ten additional ones were founded in New York, Chicago, Utah, Nebraska, Colorado, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas. By 1924, the Japanese Associations in the continental United States claimed a membership of 35,437, accounting for 27% of the total Japanese population of 131,357. Since men could only belong to the organizations, the percentage of the members in relation to the entire male population was 43%, which presents a more accurate

picture of the extent of power wielded by the Association on the Japanese in America.

Most of the Japanese immigrants were not proficient in English and were not familiar with the law and customs of the United States. The Association played an important role in helping its members to orient and adapt themselves to the new country. Association leaders encouraged the study of English to facilitate Japanese assimilation to American society. They also carried out a morals campaign with the object of steering the immigrants away from the vices of gambling and frequenting brothels. The Japanese Association also provided legal service and technical assistance for agriculturists. As early as 1913, the Japanese Association of America hired two American lawyers to defend rights of the Japanese.

The Association was a cohesive community organization, but was under the direct control of the Japanese government. In exchange for conferring the right to charge fees for endorsing applications for various certificates issued by the Consulates, the government used the Association not only to gather information and undertake investigations, such as a census, but also to closely watch and regulate the activities of the Japanese subjects throughout the United States. Whether they were members or not, no Japanese could by-pass the Association. Births and deaths had to be reported, and those applying for draft deferments, re-entry permits, and permission to bring their families from Japan had to go to the Association. The endorsements fees, which ranged from \$1 to \$4, constituted the organization's main source of revenue. The members paid lower fees than the non-members, and in the case of a local Association it had to give one half of the collected fees to the Japanese Association of America and

one third to the respective Consulate, keeping the rest for its own operating fund. Thanks to the ample authority and source of revenue provided by the home government, the Japanese Association wielded enormous power as both the leader and watch dog of the Japanese community in the United States. Nevertheless, when the Exclusion Law was enacted in 1924, which banned Japanese immigration to America, the need to obtain certificates drastically diminished, and the Association plunged into serious difficulties. With its economic basis shattered, many Japanese Associations disappeared shortly afterwards.

Picture Brides

Between 1909 and 1923, the continental United States received 120,317 Japanese in all, of whom 50,511 were returning immigrants, and 48,490 were family members. The 33,628 women who were admitted to the mainland as wives fell into one of the three categories: (1) those who had been married before their husbands migrated, (2) those whom immigrants wedded while visiting Japan for the purpose of finding mates, and (3) those who had married through the exchange of photographs and therefore had never seen their husbands until after their arrival at the American ports. The last group of women were known as picture brides, and as many as 6,988 of them entered the United States from 1912 to 1920.

There were four reasons why the system of picture brides became so popular after the Gentlemen's Agreement. First, the anti-miscegenation law in various states made it impossible for the Japanese immigrants to intermarry. Second, a majority of the immigrants were single men, many of whom by the early 1910's had amassed enough wealth to get married. After the Gentlemen's Agreement, however, they feared that further restric-

tive measurers might be taken to close the United States to Japanese immigration. Third, it was extremely difficult to go back to Japan to get married, for the trip not only entailed heavy expenses but required that the immigrants take long leaves of absence from their work. Furthermore, they could not afford to stay very long in Japan or they would have lost their draft deferment. Fourth, the custom of arranging marriages by means of exchanging photographs alone had long been practiced in Japan, and this type of marriage was quite legal according to the Japanese law.

Occasionally the system of picture brides created considerable misunderstanding for both parties concerned. Frequently, the immigrants took their pictures wearing their best suits and in front of big stores or houses that were owned by their employers. Some of the brides, on the other hand, sent pictures of other, more attractive women. In extreme cases, picture brides rejected their assigned husbands. Some married other men, and others went back to Japan. This kind of marriage was very convenient for those immigrants who could not afford to return to Japan.

Nevertheless, it was not long before the anti-Japanese agitators began to criticize the custom of picture brides as immoral. In October, 1919, in an attempt to eradicate all the causes of anti-Japanese sentiments, Japanese Ambassador to the United States Kijuro Shidehara, came to San Francisco and made the Japanese Association of America declare in the local newspapers, without consulting with other major Associations, the ban on the immigration of picture brides. Although the Central Japanese Association of Southern California lodged a strong

protest against the Japanese government, it stopped issuing passports to picture brides after March, 1920.

Demographic and Occupational Distribution

Not all of the Japanese immigrants settled down in the United States. In the case of Hawaii, over a period of 40 years from 1885 to 1924, 204,816 Japanese entered the islands, whereas 150,421, accounting for 78% of the total number of immigrants, either returned to Japan or moved to the mainland during the same period. Therefore, only 54,395 Japanese remained in Hawaii. On the other hand, between 1909 and 1923 the continental United States received 120,317 Japanese but saw 111,636 comprising as high as 93% of the total entries, return to Japan. Hence it follows that the Japanese in the mainland grew by no more than 8,681 to the exclusion of natural increase over the same time span.

According to the United States census of 1910, the Japanese in the mainland numbered 72,157, of whom 57,703, accounting for 80% of the total, resided in the Pacific Coast states, and 8,501 comprising 12%, lived in the intermountain states. As many as 41,356 Japanese, or 57% of the total population, were concentrated in California, constituting merely 1.7% of the state's population of 2,377,549. Washington followed with 12,929 Japanese, or 18% of the total Japanese population in the United States proper.

In the same year, the demographic distribution by county of the Japanese in California was as follows:

Los Angeles	8,461
San Francisco	4,518
Sacramento	3,874
Alameda	3,266
Santa Clara	2,299
Fresno	2,233
San Joaquin	1,804
Monterey	1,121
Contra Costa	1,009
Others	12,771
Total	41,356

Major Japanese communities were located in Northern California, especially around the San Francisco area, whereas Los Angeles County had already grown into the largest Japanese settlement because of the 1906 earthquake of San Francisco and the subsequent outflow of its Japanese residents into Southern California.

A survey undertaken by the Japanese government in 1908 reveals the occupational distribution of the Japanese in the continental United States as follows:

Agriculture	51%
Commerce	10%
Manufacturing	10%
Transportation	6%
Students	2%
Others	21%
Total	100%

Although comparable data on California are not available for the corresponding year, according to an investigation conducted by the Japanese government in 1912, the occupations of the Japanese in that state were broken down as follows:

Agriculture	55%
Commerce & Transportation	16%
Mining & Manufacturing	8%
Public Service & Professionals	4%

Others	15%
Unemployed	1%

Total	100%
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Since most of the Japanese in the continental United States were concentrated in California, the occupational distribution of Japanese in the former is almost identical with that in the latter.

From the outset, agriculture was the predominant occupation pursued by Japanese immigrants on the mainland. This industry's predominance was maintained through the 1920's accounting for over 50% of the Japanese labor force in any given year. The majority of the laborers classified in the category of "others" were engaged in domestic service which occupied the second most important place in the economic activities of this racial group. Commerce and manufacturing ranked the third and fourth, respectively, in the order of importance. In the case of the Japanese, the category of transportation was synonymous with that of the railroad labor.

Wage Labor

With the exception of a small number of merchants who brought capital or merchandise, at the outset the greater part of the Japanese immigrants for the continental United States engaged in some kind of manual labor. Roughly speaking, they were absorbed into one or a combination of the five segments of the labor market: domestic service, lumbering, railroad, mining, and agriculture.

Domestic service was the oldest and most popular job among the Japanese in the mainland. There were very few immigrants who had at no time worked as domestics for American families. This occupation played a significant role in the process of Japanese assimilation to the host country in that

It provided the immigrants with an ideal opportunity to learn American manners and customs, to say nothing of the English language. As the Japanese established a reputation of being honest and hardworking, the demand for Japanese servants increased steadily. In the early 1910's a domestic received a salary of \$30 to \$50 in addition to room and board. The Japanese immigrants were so ambitious and enterprising that they quit the household labor as soon as they had amassed sufficient capital to start their own business, or whenever they found more remunerative jobs elsewhere. Many Japanese later made use of their experience acquired while working as domestics to become cooks and gardeners or to open restaurants and laundries.

When the re-emigration of the Japanese from Hawaii to the mainland gained momentum around 1902, the state of Washington began to see an increasing number of Japanese laborers in its lumber industry, then the principal industry of that state. As early as 1900, some 300 Japanese were employed in sawmills, and three years later a Japanese labor contractor recruited 85 countrymen to establish the first Japanese lumber mill camp. These laborers earned \$1.25 per day, which compared quite favorably with a daily wage of thirty cents paid to skilled workers in Japan. As of 1909, approximately 2,240, accounting for 25% of the Japanese population in Washington, were reported to be working at 67 mills and logging camps throughout the state. Although daily wages had been increased to a range of \$1.65 to \$2.00 by that year, the Japanese lumber workers earned \$1 to \$1.50 less than the whites doing the same jobs. During the first World War, a boom created by a sudden increase in the demand of lumber for shipbuilding, in conjunction with a labor shortage, made it possible for the Japanese immigrants in this industry to make

as much as \$5 per day. When the war boom came to an end, however, they began to move to other occupations, with the result that by 1923 the number of Japanese employed in the lumber industry had declined to about 1,260.

The railroad was the first industry to hire those Japanese laborers who re-emigrated to the mainland from Hawaii. It was in 1891 that the way was opened for Japanese to work for the railroad companies primarily due to the efforts on the part of Japanese labor contractors. In that year, several hundred Japanese are known to have been working as section hands for the Oregon Short Line. By 1900, the number of Japanese railroad laborers had exceeded 6,000. Their work consisted mainly of the maintenance of the way and the cleaning of railway vehicles. As of September, 1908, there were close to 10,000 Japanese railroad laborers scattered about in the West Coast and Intermountain states, as well as in the states of Kansas and Nebraska. A track laborer was paid \$1.55 to \$1.75 per day, whereas a foreman received a monthly salary of \$65 to \$70 plus housing. In the Intermountain states, approximately one third of these immigrants temporarily left their employment with the railroad companies in order to work on the sugar beet fields from late May to late July and from mid-September to mid-November.

Although the railroad work was very hard, its monetary reward was by far greater than that of a comparable occupation in Japan. In the mid-1910's, a skilled laborer at a government-owned factory in Japan earned less than \$8 a month, while a railroad depot worker in Utah, for example, drew a salary of \$50 plus a room. The latter was married and had \$2,405 deposited in the Yokohama Specie Bank. Another immigrant, who had arrived at San Francisco in 1908 and became a section hand three years later, was drawing a monthly income of \$60 as of 1917. By that year, he had saved \$2,150, of

which he had remitted \$1,500 to his family in Japan. As for a foreman, on the other hand, a man, who was hired originally as a section hand in 1905 and promoted to foremanship seven years later, was receiving a salary of \$70 in 1914. In that year, he had \$1,200 in savings.

A foreman was usually provided with a house, and if he was married his wife ordinarily boarded the section gang who worked under him. Therefore, his actual income was considerably greater than what his salary indicated. Furthermore, with experience a section foreman could earn up to \$90 a month, and in an exceptional case, as much as \$180. Generally speaking, Japanese railroad workers spent approximately \$20 to \$25 each per month for living expenses. The rest of their earnings they remitted home or deposited in banks.

At this juncture it would be relevant to touch upon the lucrative job of a labor contractor who supplied the railroad companies with Japanese laborers. As of 1916, a labor contractor, who handled 150 workers had a gross annual income of \$35,000, netting \$5,000. He had been in this business for seven years, during which time he had been remitting \$500 annually to Japan. In 1916, he had \$3,500 deposited at the Garfield Bank in addition to \$1,500 in investment.

Without exception, labor contractors operated general stores to meet the daily necessities of their men. Big labor contractors even performed banking service primarily to accept deposits from the railroad workers as well as to send their remittance to Japan. Unfortunately, many of these contractor-bankers took advantage of the ignorance on the part of the laborers to embezzle their money or to make a huge profit by manipulating the conversion rate.

In 1906, as many as 13,000 Japanese were employed by the railroad companies. Four years later, however, they began to show an increasingly

more tangible tendency to leave the railroad labor. Consequently, by 1913 the number of Japanese railroad workers had dropped to 4,553. The sharp decline may be attributed to three factors. First, after the Gentlemen's Agreement all the newcomers were family members who were naturally accommodated by their householders. Second, those who had accumulated sizeable capital by several years of railroad labor went into business or independent farming. Third, those railroad laborers who had not quite "made it" yet, or those who did not wish to invest in long-range business ventures chose to take up more rewarding or at least less toilful occupations.

A significant number of Japanese immigrants were also employed by the mining industry. As far as the mining companies were concerned, however, most of the Japanese miners at first were used as scabs to cope with the rising labor movement. The reason for this was that they were obedient to their labor contractors and that the unions excluded the Japanese miners.

It was in 1898 that a labor contractor by the name of Gen Nishiyama supplied a number of Japanese laborers to the Union Pacific Railroad's coal mine in Rock Springs, Wyoming, where 26 Chinese had been massacred four years previous by unionized white miners. In 1901, Nishiyama entered into a contract with the Central Coal & Cokes Company in Utah to introduce Japanese immigrants. At the zenith of his power, this labor contractor reigned over 500 countrymen.

Daigoro Hashimoto, a big labor contractor based in Utah, opened the way in 1901 for 30 Japanese to work for the Diamond Coal Mine in Wyoming. Three years later Hashimoto recruited Japanese strikebreakers to relieve the Castlegate Coal Mine in Utah, which since November, 1903, had been plagued by a large-scale strike. The introduction of Japanese operatives

turned out so successful in Castlegate that before long other coal mines in the state began to employ Japanese immigrants. As of 1905, a Japanese coal miner's daily wage averaged \$2.50, but he could earn up to \$100 a month, while his cost of living rarely exceeded \$13.

In 1909, the Utah Copper Company, which worked the world's largest copper mine at Bingham, for the first time hired Japanese laborers who were supplied by Hayao Oka of Okayama prefecture. Oka introduced to that mine as many as 430 operatives who earned \$2 a day but had to pay the labor contractor a \$1 commission each per month. As of 1914, the Japanese workers employed at the Bingham Copper Mine numbered 650. During the boom of the first European War, these mine laborers could earn daily wages ranging from \$3.90 to \$4.15 for nine hours of work.

Since 1907, a considerable number of Japanese had been working at various smelteries in the vicinity of Salt Lake City. Although most of them were unskilled laborers, as of 1912, they were paid \$1.95 to \$2.50 a day. During the War, their monthly salary was boosted to a range of \$90 to \$110, which sum was equivalent to the annual income of a skilled laborer in Japan. Machine operators and other technicians at the smelting plants derived a monthly income of \$135 to \$150.

In 1909, Japanese immigrants engaged in the mining industry reached the 2,000 level. However, high wages due to the relative absence of a discriminatory pay scale, coupled with the tremendous boom generated by World War I, made it rather easy for many Japanese to save up enough money either to return home or to turn to business and agricultural un-

dertakings. Therefore, by 1920, the mining population among the Japanese Immigrants had diminished to only 1,132, of whom 70% were local mine operatives.

By far more important than any other type of wage labor was agriculture. After the Chinese exclusion law of 1882, Japanese Immigrants came to fill a vacuum created in the agricultural industry on the West Coast. Three factors may be enumerated to account for the large percentage of farm laborers among the Japanese. First, in the 1880's, the emphasis on California agriculture began to shift from the production of grain to horticulture which required a large number of skillful farmers. Second, the majority of Japanese immigrants came from agricultural background and were able to provide intensive care which was necessary for the cultivation of fruits and vegetables. Third, the white working class showed a marked tendency to dislike the agricultural labor and sought employment in the urban area.

As early as 1888, the first Japanese were hired on ranches in Vacaville, California. One year later, some sixty student-domestics came to pick fruits in this area during their summer vacations. Since they were educated and proficient in English, several of them later became labor contractors. By 1890, 300 Japanese were employed as farm hands in Vaca Valley. They earned \$1 a day, and 90 cents in the winter time. Nevertheless, because the Japanese on the West Coast numbered only 1,532 in that year, it was not until 1896 that the number of Japanese agricultural workers reached 1,000.

Due to its proximity to San Francisco, San Jose received Japanese Immigrants from the early days. While visiting this region on a peddling

tour in 1890, Tokutaro Oishi signed a contract with a cannery to supply Japanese fruit pickers. Within five years, the Japanese employed on orchards increased to 2,300 and replaced the Chinese as the dominant labor group.

The vineyards of Fresno, the world's largest grape-producing center, attracted even more Japanese farm laborers. Since Otesaburo Noda brought thirty immigrants to this region in 1890, every year an increasing number of Japanese had been introduced during the two-month harvest season beginning in late August. Grape picking had been dominated by the Chinese seasonal laborers until 1897, in which year 3,000 Japanese came to Fresno. As the grape pickers were paid on the piece-rate basis, experienced and dexterous workers could earn as much as \$5 per day.

In the spring of 1908, Tetsugoro Takeuchi, a socialist who had been influenced by Shusui Kotoku, came to Fresno with the object of organizing Japanese farm laborers. Together with other socialists, Takeuchi founded a labor union in August of that year, and in less than two months, 4,000 out of 6,000 Japanese grape pickers became members. The union issued an organ with a circulation of 4,000. In the same year, under the leadership of the socialists the union members successfully fought against the labor contractors to raise the piecemeal rate and lower the commissions charged by the latter. Since, however, the members were seasonal farm laborers who moved from one place to another, the Japanese labor union could not survive more than two years.

The appearance of Japanese farm hands in Southern California lagged several years behind that in Northern and Central California. In 1900, the first group of some 50 Japanese students and immigrants were introduced to the sugar beets industry in Santa Maria. Around the same time, a sugar

company in Oxnard began to employ Japanese for the cultivation of sugar beets. By 1902, under ten labor contractors, more than 1,000 Japanese agricultural laborers were working for this company. As of two years later, while a farm hand had to toil ten hours a day to earn \$1.25, a foreman received a salary of \$150, not to mention other sources of his income. Of the 5,000 Japanese farm laborers who were reported to be in Southern California in 1906, 2,000 were employed by the citrus-fruits industry, 1,000 in sugar beets, 800 in celery, and 600 each in strawberries and vegetables.

By the early 1910's, the number of agricultural wage laborers began to show a steady decline among the Japanese in the mainland. In California, for instance, Japanese farm hands decreased by 504 from 16,298 in 1914 to 15,794 in 1917. Conversely, however, during the same period the number of farm owners among the Japanese increased by 478 from 7,495 to 7,973. This phenomenon implies a strong tendency among the Japanese farm laborers to embark on independent farming as soon as they saved up enough money to do so.

Japanese in California Agriculture and the Alien Land Law of 1913

Available data indicates that Hoichi Sumida and Saikichi Abe, both from Hiroshima prefecture, were the first Japanese immigrants to own agricultural land in California. In 1901, they purchased forty acres of land each in the Fresno area and started viniculture. Within a few years, many Japanese farm laborers followed suit to become landed farmers. Since California was abundant in arable land, in those days, it was relatively easy to obtain land at a moderate price.

In order to rise from the status of farm hands to that of farm owners, as a rule the immigrants went through one or a combination of the three stages in between: contract farming, sharecropping, and leasing. Contract farming varied from a quasi-wage labor to a large-scale operation. In the former case, in exchange for his labor a contract farmer received a fixed percentage or a salary plus a bonus. In the latter case, on the other hand, a contractor cultivated primarily sugar beets and seeds in a large way, and charged a fixed amount by the weight. As early as 1896 Kosaburo Baba made a contract to grow sugar beets on 250 acres of land in the Salinas Valley. Under the terms of this contract, he was paid \$1.25 for every ton of beets he produced. Five years later, the rate was raised to \$1.50. In San Jose, one of the major seeds-producing centers, Tokutaro Oishi and three other immigrants jointly entered into a contract in 1903 to engage in the production of seeds on a tract of 600 acres. For every pound of onion and lettuce seeds, for example, these contractors received eight and ten cents, respectively. Unless it was done on an extensive scale, however, contract farming was rarely a sure method to accumulate capital.

Sharecropping was very popular among those immigrants who were destitute of capital. According to this system, the landlord supplied housing, farm tools, and irrigation water, while the sharecropper in return gave him 40% to 60% of the harvest depending on the type of crop. The Japanese farm laborers had already received such recognition for their high productivity that many American landowners were willing to have Japanese sharecroppers. As far as the immigrants were concerned, since it involved neither investment nor a risk on their part,

sharecropping was a very convenient device to achieve their upward mobility.

When Japanese had laid up a considerable amount of money, they turned to the leasing of agricultural lands. This type of farming usually required sizeable initial investment and operating fund on the part of the renter. Thanks to their established reputation as good farmers, however, many Japanese tenant farmers were afforded by landlords, shippers, or merchants various conveniences ranging from financing to sale on credit of daily necessities. The lease was for a period of one to five years. In 1905 the annual rent averaged \$10 per acre.

Since large numbers of the immigrants came from the landed farmers' class, it was natural that they should have wished to engage eventually in independent farming on their own lands. Arable land was purchased quite easily. The buyer had only to make down payment equivalent to 10% to 25% of the price of the tract, and the rest could be paid in yearly installments over a period of eight to ten years. Therefore a prospective farm owner needed to save enough money for the initial payment and the first year's working capital. From the second year on he could make payments out of his crop. Under these circumstances, after 1902 the number of Japanese farm owners began to increase at faster rates in California. Consequently, the acreage under Japanese ownership multiplied to 2,442 acres in 1905, as compared with 907 acres three years earlier.

Between 1905 and 1910 the total acreage cultivated by Japanese farmers increased as follows:

	1905	1910
Acreage owned	2,442	16,980
Acreage leased	35,258	89,464
Acreage under share	19,572	50,399
Acreage under contract	4,775	37,898

Total acreage	62,047	194,741
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During this period Japanese landholding expanded sevenfold to 16,980 acres, accounting for merely 0.15% of California's total acreage under cultivation which was reported to be 11,389,894 acres. Even the aggregate of all types of agricultural lands worked by the Japanese immigrants excluding farm laborers amounted to no more than 1.7% of the state's total cultivated land. Furthermore, Japanese farmers ordinarily operated small farms. In 1910 the average size of a farm in California was 317 acres, whereas that of a Japanese farm was 48 acres. As high as 56% of the farms tilled by Japanese agriculturists were under 30 acres, while farms measuring over 100 acres constituted only 14% of the total. In terms of productivity, however, the Japanese proved to be excellent farmers. When the average yield per acre was valued at \$40.15 in that state, the Japanese agriculturists produced \$74.91 worth of crops per acre. Nonetheless, it should be borne in mind that their high productivity was partly due to the fact that on the whole the Japanese engaged in intensive agriculture rather than extensive agriculture whose yield per acre was naturally smaller.

The Japanese immigrants deserve credit for introducing the lucrative rice culture into the Sacramento Valley, as well as turning the vast marsh land in the Stockton area into one of California's richest agricultural regions. The majority of the Japanese farmers concentrated on the horticulture, thereby making maximum use of their small farms and techniques. They continued to expand the sphere of their agricultural activity,

but in 1913 the Alien Land Law was enacted by the California legislature to disrupt their steady economic progress. The legislation was intended to prohibit the Japanese from further acquiring agricultural lands and holding leases over three years.

Since, however, the Alien Land Law did not specifically apply to the Japanese, but to aliens ineligible to citizenship, before long loopholes were discovered to greatly reduce its effect. In an effort to counteract this discriminatory law, the Japanese founded numerous land corporations jointly with American citizens so they could legally purchase real property. Moreover, many immigrants purchased and registered new farms under the names of their American-born children who were United States citizens by virtue of jus soli. With respect to leasing, the Alien Land Law was rarely enforced in its strictest sense because most of the American landlords gained more by retaining Japanese tenants.

The Japanese in California accounted for a very small percentage of the state's agricultural land and population. In addition, they lacked capital, and therefore the danger or possibility of their dominating California agriculture was minuscule. However, a number of demagogic local politicians resorted to racist tactics for their own political gains. They aroused racial hatred against the Japanese as a whole, as well as false and unnecessary fear of the Japanese farmers. The course of history was often determined not by what actually happened, but rather by what people were led to believe happened. The passage of the Alien Land Law in California was one of these cases.

By 1910, the Japanese farmers had already become a viable and positive element of California's agricultural industry. At the same time, however, there existed five factors which contributed to nurturing

an atmosphere in which the politicians' anti-Japanese agitations resulted in the enactment in 1913 of such a hostile law. First, concentration of the Japanese immigrants in certain localities and their easily recognizable physical features made their existence very conspicuous, thus creating illusions in the minds of white Americans that the Japanese were much more numerous than they actually were. Second, the Japanese farmers controlled 25% to 50% of the farm lands in several agricultural centers of Northern California, where their penetration and predominance were strongly felt. Third, between 1907 and 1913, Japanese-controlled agricultural lands jumped from 131,203 to 281,687 acres. The reason for this rapid increase was that after the first futile attempt was made in 1907 to regulate by a legislative act the Japanese activity in California agriculture, in anticipation of the inevitable passage of such a discriminating law, the immigrants intensified their efforts to purchase and lease as much land as possible. Ironically, however, their passive and defensive action to prepare for the worst had the adverse effect of providing for the public the semblance of evidence necessary to support the argument of the anti-Japanese agitators. Fourth, there was a partisan rivalry between President Woodrow Wilson, a Democrat, and Governor Hiram Johnson, a Republican who was reputed to have aspirations to enter the White House. As the state legislators were also predominantly Republican, the President could not effectively control the Governor or the legislature. However, there is some evidence to imply that President Wilson failed to fully exercise his power and influence to prevent the enactment of the 1913 Alien Land Law in California. Fifth, in a broader context, Japan's emergence as a world power following the Russo-Japanese War had been viewed in the United States with growing fear, suspicion, and jealousy. In 1910, Japan annexed Korea and two

years later achieved hegemony in Southern Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia to monopolize their resource. Since 1909, President William Taft had been promoting "Dollar Diplomacy" in an effort to include China within American influence by means of investment. In collusion with Russia, however, in 1910 and 1912, Japan repeatedly undermined the American attempt to control China economically through the Quadruple Loan Consortium composed of the United States, Great Britain, France, and Germany. Having suffered a major setback in its confrontation with Japan over the riches of China, the United States government now found itself under strong temptation to take some retaliatory measure against the Japanese subjects in America. In 1913 American frustration engendered by the diplomatic impasse finally found a vent in the institution of statutory racial discrimination against the Japanese farmers in California.

The Japanese community challenged the validity of the Alien Land Law by filing a number of lawsuits, the most important being the Ozawa case. Since the application of this law was restricted to aliens ineligible for citizenship, Takao Ozawa of Hawaii attempted to make the legislation a dead letter by proving that he was eligible for naturalization in the United States. In 1914, he volunteered to institute a test case in Hawaii on behalf of the Japanese in America because it was widely known that he had met all the requirements for a United States citizenship. He had studied law at the University of California, Berkeley, and some of his literary works had been published in English. Furthermore, with respect to financial status, Ozawa compared favorably with the white middle-class Americans. In the ensuing year, the case was decided against the plaintiff at the first trial on the ground that the Mongoloid stock was not eligible for citizenship. Ozawa appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court in San Francisco, which in 1917 decided, in view of the severity of a

precedent to be established to pass the case on to the United States Supreme Court. In 1922, the Supreme Court finally decided on the Ozawa case, sustaining the judgment of the lower court. The ruling established a precedent which was later used to provide a legal basis for excluding Japanese immigrants by the 1924 Immigration Act.

Due to its loopholes, the Alien Land Law failed to inflict any substantial damage upon the Japanese farmers. Moreover, the outbreak of hostilities in Europe and a subsequent war boom helped divert the American public's attention from the anti-Japanese movement and sentiments. In spite of the hostile law, the achievement in 1917 of the 6,130 Japanese farming households in developing California agriculture deserves some attention. In that year, Japanese-controlled farms expanded from 281,687 acres in 1913 to 390,635 acres, comprising only 3.25% of the state's total cultivated land of some 12,000,000 acres. In contrast with some 65,000 American landowners whose average landholding amounted to 200 acres, there were 7,973 Japanese farm owners who possessed on the average 3.75 acres each. In terms of cultivated acreage as a whole, an American farmer averaged 185 acres, whereas a Japanese counterpart tilled 48 acres on the average. In 1917, the total output by the Japanese agriculturists was valued at \$55,000,000, accounting for 11% of California's total agricultural production of \$500,000,000. With respect to average yield per acre, the Japanese were at least three times more productive than the Americans. Specifically, the former produced \$141 per acre, and the latter \$42. Purely from the viewpoint of evaluating the Japanese contribution to the state's economy, these figures may safely be taken at face value. Nevertheless, for the purpose of presenting the whole picture concerning their actual earnings, the above statistical data have to be analyzed carefully in the light of the following fact.

It is true that the war boom produced a number of nouveaux riches among the Japanese farmers, especially rice growers in Northern California, but net profits for most of the Japanese agriculturists were not so impressive as the total Japanese agricultural output of \$55,000,000 might indicate. In view of the fact that of the 6,034 Japanese-controlled farms as many as 5,507, accounting for 92% of the total acreage, were cultivated by renters, sharecroppers, and contractors, a considerable portion of these landless farmers' gross earnings fell into the hands of American landlords. Although the Japanese farmers as a whole produced \$55,000,000 worth of crops, after deducting \$13,750,000 (25%) in rents, \$22,000,000 (40%) in wages paid to farm hands, \$11,000,000 (20%) in the cost of harvesting and packing, and \$4,125,000 (7.5%) in maintenance and provisions, the Japanese agricultural sector was left with net profits of only \$4,125,000, or 7.5% of their total output.

The 1920 Alien Land Law and the 1924 Immigration Act

During and immediately following the European War agricultural products fetched such high prices that the Japanese farmers greatly expanded their operations. As compared with the figures of 1917, three years later, the Japanese owned 44,463 acres more and worked 22,958 acres more under lease, share, and contract. In the meantime, however, the postwar boom came to a close, and there were already signs of an ensuing depression. It was then that anti-Japanese sentiments began to reemerge. Now that the War was concluded in 1918 and the Versailles Peace Treaty signed the year after, the American people again turned their attention to the Japanese issues at home and abroad. In California, the Japanese had long been getting around the 1913 Alien Land Law to buy and lease

agricultural lands rather freely, with the result that the Japanese-controlled farms were increasing rapidly in number and acreage.

In the international scene, on the other hand, the relations between Japan and the United States continued to deteriorate after World War I. There were three major confrontations which resulted in intensifying American resentment against Japan. First, in spite of President Wilson's vehement protest, the Versailles Peace Treaty confirmed Japan's right to take over all the German interests in Shantung Province and possessions in the Southern Pacific north of the equator. Second, overriding the American government's opposition, in January, 1918, Japan dispatched troops to Siberia in an effort to overthrow the revolutionary regime in Russia. While the United States, Great Britain, and France withdrew their forces from Siberia by the spring of 1920, Japan maintained her anti-revolutionary expedition through 1922. Third, in an attempt to deprive Japan of her special interests in Manchuria and Mongolia, in 1919 the United States proposed to organize the Quadruple Loan Consortium with Japan, Great Britain, and France in order to jointly own all the future and existing foreign rights and interests in China. Although the loan group was formed the year after, Japan managed to keep her prerogative intact. With its attempts repeatedly foiled to weaken the Japanese supremacy in the Far East, the United States government began to assume an increasingly hostile attitude toward Japan. It was under these circumstances that a series of more repressive measures was taken against the Japanese in the United States.

For the state election of 1920, anti-Japanese agitation was again used as convenient political propaganda. Several politicians running for legislative offices resorted to an anti-Japanese campaign to gain

attention and popularity. They proposed a more effective Alien Land Law, which was enacted through the initiative in November of that year. The new law prohibited the Japanese from becoming cash or share tenants, as well as acquiring agricultural lands by means of land corporations. In 1923, the legislation was amended to ban contract farming, which totally deprived the Japanese immigrants of the right to pursue agriculture in any capacity other than that of farm hands unless they already owned farms. Consequently, between 1920 and 1923 Japanese landholding diminished by 24,227 acres, while the total acreage cultivated by the Japanese farmers decreased by as many as 128,003 acres during the same period. The drastic decline in the Japanese-controlled acreage should partly be ascribed to the postwar slump in the agricultural market and the subsequent curtailment by the Japanese farmers of their operations. Nonetheless, the aforementioned figures no doubt attest to the severity of the impact which the 1920 Alien Land Law exerted on the agricultural industry of the Japanese in California.

A serious blow to their economic basis notwithstanding, in 1924, the Japanese still controlled 4.5% of California's total acreage under cultivation, accounting for 10.7% of the state's total agricultural output. In that year, the Japanese farmers' share in the production of major crops was as follows:

Onions	86.0%
Strawberries	81.3%
Asparagus	53.2%
Melons	34.7%
Vegetables	33.5%
Potatoes	22.2%
Rice	16.9%
Grapes	16.0%
Beans	12.2%
Fruits	6.6%

As has been discussed earlier, the bulk of their total output passed into

the hands of others, enriching the state of California as a whole. However, the fact or the reality mattered little in the face of the mounting anti-Japanese feeling.

After the European War, the extremely strained relations between Japan and the United States had already generated on the Pacific Coast a milieu in which a small number of political aspirants could easily detonate the racial prejudice latent in American society by inflammatory speeches. Once given an outlet and direction, racism could no longer be contained at the local level.

The anti-Japanese movement, which had revived in 1920, culminated in the enactment of the Immigration Act of 1924 to exclude Japanese immigrants from the United States. From the viewpoint of world politics, the Exclusion Law was an unfortunate by-product of the rivalry between Japan and the United States in the process of their imperialistic exploitation of China. Since receiving a few major setbacks in its attempt to prevent Japan from becoming too powerful in the Far East, the United States government had been intensifying its counteroffensive to break the deadlock through various means. First, the United States asked Great Britain not to renew the Anglo-Japanese Alliance which was due to expire in 1921. As a result, in spite of the good will visit to London by the Japanese Crown Prince (the present Emperor) in March, 1921, the British government denounced the Alliance two months later. Second, in collusion with Great Britain, the American government invited Japan to the Washington Conference in November of the same year for the purpose of checking further expansion of the Japanese navy. The United States succeeded in maintaining her naval supremacy over Japan by instituting capital ship limitation at the ratio of five to three in the

former's favor. Lastly, the United States' "Open Door Policy" in China was endorsed by major powers during the Nine Power Conference which was held in Washington concurrently with the naval disarmament conference. Not only did the Nine Power Treaty of 1921 deny Japan her special interests in Manchuria and Mongolia, but forced her to return to the Chinese government all the former German interests in Shantung Province. Having gathered such momentum, the anti-Japanese offensive was bound to run to its conclusion.

In handing down its ruling on the Ozawa case in November, 1922, the Supreme Court of the United States declared the Japanese race as ineligible to become naturalized in that country. The Supreme Court decision cleared the legal obstacle to the ultimate goal of the Japanophobes, namely, the exclusion of Japanese immigrants. Since Congress had to establish a new quota system for foreign immigration by June, 1924, anti-Japanese politicians took this opportunity to include in the Immigration Act of 1924 a clause providing the exclusion of aliens ineligible for citizenship. Many advocates of the discriminatory measure criticized the Japanese for being too proud and nationalistic to accept American values and way of life. Attempts were repeatedly made to link the existence in America of such dangerous and unassimilable aliens with the increasing threat of their mother country's imperialistic expansion in Asia. With Japanophobia permeated throughout the country and the racial inferiority of the Japanese seemingly confirmed by the Supreme Court, the Exclusion Law passed both Houses of Congress by an overwhelming majority in May of 1924. Under the provision of the new Immigration Act, even the immediate family members of resident immigrants could no longer come to the United States. From the practical viewpoint of controlling Japanese immigration, however, such statutory exclusion

was hardly necessary. The Japanese government had faithfully been abiding by the Gentlemen's Agreement to voluntarily restrict the emigration of Japanese to the United States. During the period from 1909 to 1923, the difference between the total Japanese entries and the total departures from the continental United States was merely 8,681. It is tantamount to an average increase of 578 per year. Furthermore, as was exemplified by the voluntary ban on the migration of picture brides after 1920, the Japanese government was willing to comply with any American request to restrict Japanese immigration.

As far as economic factors were concerned, there was none to necessitate or justify the enactment of the Exclusion Law. As of October 1, 1920, there were 115,524 Japanese on the mainland of whom 74,151, comprising 64% of the total, were in the labor force. Of the working population as many as 9,535, or 13% of the total, were unemployed, and 38,087, accounting for 51%, were engaged in agriculture. Since the Japanese agricultural sector consisted mostly of farm laborers and landless farmers, a considerable portion of their output passed into the hands of their employers, landlords, or financiers. Even in California, Japanese landholding was negligible and even the aggregate of all the Japanese-controlled farms never exceeded 5% of the state's total acreage under cultivation. It ought to be made clear that American landlords and crop brokers favored Japanese farmers and farm hands and that the anti-Japanese movement was carried out by ambitious politicians and supported by the non-agricultural sector. Although commerce and manufacturing, respectively, accounted for 12% and 7% of the Japanese in the labor force, these figures include a large number of employees. As for the proprietors, they had meager capital and operated their

enterprises on small scales. Besides, Japanese businessmen and manufacturers either catered primarily to Japanese clientele or went into those areas where they encountered little or no competition from American counterparts. Even in California, where most of the Japanese in the mainland were concentrated, they could not have possibly affected the economy of the state, still less that of the United States sufficiently to warrant restriction of their economic activity, since they were extremely small in number.

In a purely economic sense, the Japanese in the United States were much better off than their countrymen in Japan. As compared with Americans, however, the immigrants undoubtedly fared poorly; for due to the language barrier and discrimination, many of the Japanese were compelled to pursue those types of occupations which were unattractive to white Americans. As for the Japanese operators of farms, factories, and business establishments, most of them were small landowners or tenants, small-scale manufacturers, and petty tradesmen. Hence it may be safely concluded that the Japanese in the mainland were not taking jobs away from American workers, nor were they such formidable competitors that they threatened American agriculturists and entrepreneurs.

As one of the anti-Japanese agitators argued, the passage of the Exclusion Law was a question of race desirability. The proponents of the legislation accused the Japanese of being the most unassimilable race, but as was often the case with racial demagoguery, their argument was not only groundless but illogical. It is difficult for the first generation of any immigrant group to achieve a considerable degree of assimilation to the host country. Acculturation is a long, time-consuming process, which actually starts with the second generation.

It was not until after 1895 that the Japanese in the continental United States grew into a sizeable community. Because the majority of the immigrants were single men, the growth of the second generation was considerably delayed. In 1920, the Nisei population reached 29,672, but a high percentage of them were still under fourteen years of age. The occupational distribution of the Japanese in the mainland was partly responsible for their alleged non-assimilability. From the outset, the Japanese immigrants had been engaged primarily in non-urban occupations, above all agriculture, which did not require proficiency in English or much contact with the American people.

Finally, it has to be pointed out that the advocates of anti-Japanese measures were outright hypocrites. They branded the Japanese race as the least assimilable, but those anti-Japanese demagogues were the same people that had been excluding the Japanese immigrants from American society for nearly two decades. As a matter of fact, the proponents of the Exclusion Law had never wanted the Japanese to be incorporated into American life and therefore had subjected them to several discriminatory measures in an effort to segregate this race from the socio-economic mainstream of the United States. When the host country was rejecting the Japanese immigrants, they could not have possibly been expected to achieve assimilation at the same rate as other immigrant groups which did not suffer from the same degree of racial discrimination. It may not be an overstatement to maintain that the Japanese did well not to assimilate to American society because it would have meant, in a sense, assimilation to a racist society.